Monday, August 18, 2008

The Iran War: Closer


Last week when I posted about the Iran war, it was on again. By Friday, it was off again. Now its said to be back on again. At least Debka is reporting Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait believe its on. Debka is semi-reliable. Its very much in tune with Israeli Military Intelligence. Frequently, things are presented as fact that are opinion, guesses or spin. But they do have information nobody else does, so you have to put up with the editorial line.

As I noted last week, the end of August will be critical. There will be three US carrier task groups, two US Marine expeditionary forces in the area and a new moon. If they did plan to attack, that's what they would need. Look for a Persian Gulf of Tonkin incident around the 25th.

Nevertheless, I still think there will be no war. The Pentagon and its constituent groups have been not only opposed, but unusually publicly opposed. Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary has himself spoken against an attack. Gates is a very experienced Washington operator. Since taking office he has taken numerous actions to gain stronger bureaucratic control over the military. This control has been at the expense of the White House, and Dick Cheney in particular. If the White House wants to engage in a new war over the public opposition of a cohesive Pentagon, they will need huge political leverage. George Bush's performance over the last two weeks suggest he is not a man with much in the way of leverage. Specifically, I'm talking about his apparent public drunkenness at the Olympics and the impotent threats directed at Russia. He has lame duck written all over him.

Apart from the institutional and political problems Bush would need to overcome, there are a lot of facts on the ground that recommend against attack. First and most importantly, there is no possibility of deposing the Iranian Islamic government or ending their nuclear development via air strikes. So what would be the point? As I detailed last week, the only logical attack plan entails a huge operation. This would deplete America's strategic reserve, cause political and diplomatic problems worldwide, and probably cause a domestic political crisis just before a hugely important election. And that's without any Iranian response.

Last week I promised an examination of possible Iranian responses. But spinning scenarios for a series of events I'm arguing will never happen seems wrong somehow. Let's just say that the Iranians have three possible avenues for counter-attack. Direct and proxy military action against the Strait of Hormuz and US forces in Iraq, proxy action via Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria aimed at Israel, and unconventional action (i.e. car bombing US Embassys in 3rd countries and the like). The Iranians could cause significant disruption of traffic in the Strait, but would soon be blown to smithereens by the US Navy. Their ability to harass Israel via proxies is doubtful in my mind. None of the named organizations are Iranian puppets. All have limited will or capacity to do much damage. Attacks against US targets in 3rd countries that kills locals is simply stupid, and the Iranians aren't stupid. The only area where the US is vulnerable is Iraq. The Army and Air Force depend on a long and difficult to defend road that runs through Shia country from Basra to Baghdad. The Iraqi Shiite groups are most emphatically not the errand boys of Tehran, but conditions inside Iraq could make it desirable for one of the Shiite players to get involved.

There is little Tehran can do to materially blunt the US attack. They could get some traction from closing the Strait, if only briefly. They might also get a lucky shot from a land-based missile against a US carrier. In addition, a coordinated and sustained attack against US supply lines in Iraq could cause significant problems. Any direct or proxy attacks against Israel are likely to yield little of value. The IAF would love an excuse to hammer the Syrians, but the Army can't be very enthusiastic about another invasion of South Lebanon. They suffered a humiliating defeat there two years ago. In the complex world of Arab politics, an attack on Iran would be cautiously welcomed, an Israeli attack on Syria undesirable, but tolerable. Further de-stabilization of Iraq would be a serious problem. They don't want a stronger Iran, but they also don't want a bruised Iran making trouble for them as payback for supporting the Americans.

The Europeans would have mixed reactions. Brown is weak and the support of the UK is critical. US strategic bombing would be seriously degraded if they were unable to use bases in the UK and at Diego Garcia. The French seem keen to kick someone's ass in the Middle-East, so they might be a surprise. The Germans, Italians, Spanish, Dutch and Belgians will be against the war and unlikely to allow their bases to be used. The Eastern European EU members will be conflicted. Russia will be 100% in the Iran camp. That's significant because the Russians can supply lots of intelligence, including real-time satellite and signals intelligence. China will be very unhappy, but will probably stay out. That guarantees the UN will be no help to the US.

To summarize, the US has the means on hand to attack, and the timing is right. All they need is an excuse. However, the chance of removing the Islamic government or ending the nuclear program are nil. There is significant opposition to the operation within the US Military. Regular US allies will not provide substantial material or political support. Israel is not in a position to provide material assistance, or capitalize on the crisis to re-order their immediate neighborhood. The Arab countries are scared that any outcome will be bad for them. A big US attack would extend their weakness in strategic reserve, creating vulnerabilities elsewhere. An attack, no matter how it turned out, would strengthen Russian influence in the Middle-East, and could draw China into the region. All of this would have to be dealt with by a lame duck president unable to bring political leverage to the problems being created. It would also be done immediately in advance of a key US election. The outcome of that election could have an impact on the personal fortunes of those making the attack decision.

Put that all together and the whole thing looks crazy, as indeed, it is. I don't be a war. The USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Pieliu will go home at the end of the month, and the USS Ronald Regan soon after. Everything will settle down until Obama is inaugurated. That's what I think will happen.